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THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

GERALD N. ROSENBERG*
The 1964 Civil Rights Act' is the most important and potentially powerful
anti-discrimination law ever enacted by the U.S. Congress. Although the
majestic guarantee of equal protection was enshrined in the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, it took nearly another century before all three branches of
government were willing to act in a meaningful way to enforce it. What led
the Congress to act? Why has the implementation of the Act ebbed and
flowed? What do the answers to these questions suggest about its future
implementation and the future of anti-discrimination law more generally?
1. THE CONVENTIONAL STORY

Most lawyers will say, as an article of faith, that the 1964 Civil Rights Act
was largely the result of the 1954 Brown decision. 2 In Brown, the Court held
that race-based segregation of elementary and secondary public schools
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The conventional story is that the
principle announced in Brown, that "separate but equal" was inherently
unequal, quickly spread from schools to all walks of life, leading Congress to
act. Indeed, most commentators (and I assume most readers) have "little
doubt' 4 about the compelling nature of this story. As C. Herman Pritchett put
in 1954, does
it in 1964, "[I]f the Court had not taken that first giant step
5
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The conventional story also suggests that after passage of the Act the
interplay between legislation and adjudication has been the determining factor
of its efficacy. In particular, judicial interpretation and enforcement of the Act
*
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1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Id. at 493.
4. See Charles Lawrence, "One More River to Cross"-Recognizing the Real Injury in
Brown: A Prerequisiteto Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 49 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
5. C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protection and the Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
869, 869 (1964).
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has determined its strength in combating discrimination. In other words,
continuing implementation of the Act depends to a large extent on the
reception it receives in the courts. To fight discrimination, then, the battle
must be waged in the courts. This, too, is the conventional wisdom.
In this short article I suggest that the conventional story is both wrong and
misleading. It is wrong because it misses the underlying structure of the battle
against discrimination. The battle is, and has always been, political. Thus, the
conventional story is off base on two key points. First, it under-appreciates the
role of the civil rights movement in the creation of the 1964 Act. Second, it
gives insufficient attention to the role of social movements in its
implementation. It abstracts courts and law from the broader society in which
they operate. Thus the conventional story is misleading because it suggests
implementation is possible without political mobilization. In the rest of this
article I elaborate on these points. In the final section, I illustrate the argument
by considering how women mobilized to put teeth into the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex contained in Title VII of the Act.
H. THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1964 CIvIL RIGHTS ACT
Contrary to the conventional story, there is scant evidence that Brown
contributed much to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 6 The Act owes
its existence to the civil rights movement of the early 1960s that created a
political and moral force that moved Congress and the courts. Consider, for
example, how presidents reacted to the Brown decision. President Eisenhower
refused to endorse the decision. Although he did send the 101st Airborne to
Little Rock, Arkansas, in response to violence and the violation of federal
court orders, he made no major effort to end discrimination. As Roy Wilkins,
the Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), put it, "[I]f he had fought World War7 1 the way he
fought for civil rights, we would all be speaking German today."
President Kennedy was little better. During the 1960 campaign he stated
that the President could end discrimination in federally assisted housing with
the stroke of a pen, but it took over a year-and-a-half and an "Ink for Jack"
campaign that flooded the White House With ink bottles before a "watereddown, non-retroactive order" was issued.8 The Kennedy administration
offered no civil rights bill until February 1963, and the bill it offered then was
"a collection of minor changes far more modest than the 1956 Eisenhower

6. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 107-56 (1991).
7. ROY WILKINS & TOM MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY
WILKINS 222 (1982).
8. VICTOR S. NAVASKY. KENNEDY JUSTICE 97 (1971).
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program." 9 When a House subcommittee modified and strengthened the bill,
Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with the members of the full Judiciary
Committee in executive session and "criticized the subcommittee draft in
almost every detail."' 0 The President specifically objected to the prohibition of
job discrimination that became Title VII, the provision making the Civil Rights
Commission a permanent agency, the provision empowering the attorney
general to sue on behalf of individuals alleging racial discrimination, and the
provisions mandating no discrimination in federally funded programs and
allowing fund cut-offs." The conventional story finds no support in the tepid
efforts of both Eisenhower and Kennedy in reaction to Brown.
President Johnson was supportive of civil rights. He lobbied hard for the
Civil Rights Act. He gave several moving speeches to Congress and the nation
in support of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (and the 1965 Voting Rights Act). In
those speeches, however, he focused on the violence that peaceful black
the
protesters were subjected to, the unfairness of racial discrimination, and
2
desire to honor the memory of President Kennedy, not Court decisions.'
The legislative history of the Act also provides no evidence for the
conventional story. If the conventional story is correct, one would have
expected at least some Senators to talk about the constitutional mandate in
Brown as an argument for passing the bill during the Senate debate, but this is
not the case. In the lengthy Senate debates there was hardly a mention of
Brown. Among the approximately four million words spoken in the Senate,
references to Brown can be found on only a few dozen out of many thousands
of pages of debate.' 3 While much of the focus of the debate was on the
constitutionality of the proposed legislation, and on the Fourteenth
Amendment, the concern was not with how Brown mandated legislative action,
or even how Brown made such a bill possible. This is surprising because it
would have been very easy for pressured and uncertain members of Congress
to shield their actions behind the constitutional mandate announced by the
Court. That they did not credit the Court with affecting their decisions
prevents the debates from providing evidence for the conventional story. Thus,
there does not appear to be evidence for the influence of Brown on legislative
action.

9. GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND

THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 24 (1969).
10. DANIEL M. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW: CONGRESS ENACTS CIVIL RIGHTS

LEGISLATION 21-22 (2d ed. 1966); see also CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 44-45 (1985).

11.

BERMAN, supra note 11, at 22-23; Jack Greenberg, Preface to Blacks and the Law, 407

ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. ix, ix (1973).

12. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 121.
13. Id..
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What, then, led to congressional action and the passage of the Act? The
answer is the civil rights movement and the political pressure it created. From
the Montgomery bus boycott to the sit-ins to the Freedom Rides to the
Birmingham demonstrations of 1963 to the March on Washington, the civil
rights movement raised the issue of racial discrimination in a way that was
impossible to ignore. This was especially the case when peaceful protestors
were met with violence from local whites and from local police, and when the
press covered it. When Birmingham, Alabama Police Commissioner Bull
Connor's police unleashed vicious attack dogs and sprayed high-power water
cannons on unarmed, peaceful protestors, some of whom were children, and
the national media recorded it, the nation was aghast. It was the courage of the
protestors, and the national unmasking of the viciousness of racial segregation,
that created the pressure for civil rights. Civil rights action, especially in the
1960s, was based in large part on the elite belief that, unless there was federal
action on civil rights, mass bloodshed would occur. As Berman notes, "First
President Kennedy and then President Johnson, as well as the bipartisan
leadership in Congress, came to the conclusion that only a strong civil rights
bill could possibly prevent widespread racial bloodshed and utter catastrophe
for the nation."' 4 The fear of violence, not the inspiration of Court action, was
most clearly a major impetus for federal action.
The lesson to be drawn from this brief history is that enacting powerful
anti-discrimination law requires political mobilization. Members of Congress
are unlikely to take courageous positions unless they are pressured to do so.
Brown was decided in 1954, but the Congress did not act for a decade. What
was missing was powerful political mobilization, When that mobilization
occurred, Congress responded.,
III. IMPLEMENTATION

If the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was the result of political
mobilization, what about its implementation? Here, too, the evidence points to
political mobilization as key.
The conventional story abstracts courts and judges from the social and
political world in which they live. Judges do not come out of thin air; they are
The more political
appointed through a decidedly political process.
mobilization there is around anti-discrimination law, the more likely it is that
judges will be appointed who are sympathetic to its aims. This suggests that
the future of anti-discrimination law largely depends on political mobilization.
The movement that pressured Congress to act in 1964 has never again reached
the same level of power and thus influence. The result has been a fluctuation
in the Act's implementation. The point is simple: without the kind of political

14. BERMAN, supra note 11, at 139.
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mobilization that led to passage of the Act, the battle to end discrimination is
unlikely to make major strides.
The crucial role of political mobilization is well illustrated by the treatment
of sex discrimination in Title VII. I5 Interestingly, although the Act was
designed to end discrimination against African-Americans, women have
greatly benefited. This is largely because of the political mobilization of
women that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The inclusion of the prohibition of sex discrimination in Title VII appears
to have resulted in large part from the failure of a tactical move by opponents
of the civil rights bill.' 6 The thinking was that prohibiting sex discrimination
in hiring was such a silly idea that its inclusion in the bill would doom it. The
amendment was introduced as "my little amendment" by Representative
Howard W. Smith, chairman of the House Rules Committee and an implacable
opponent of civil rights.17 In support of his amendment, Smith read a letter to
the House from a woman complaining that there were 2,661,000 more women
than men and asking Congress to do something about it.' 8 "I read that letter,"
Smith said on the floor of the House, "just to illustrate that women have some
real grievances."' 19 After this action that, Caroline Bird reports, "brought down
the house," 20 Smith opposed transferring the amendment to Title X,
Miscellaneous, because, as he put it, "women are entitled to more dignity than
that.",21 The sex amendment was supported by a host of Southern members
distinguished by their historic opposition to civil rights and was opposed by
strong liberal supporters of the bill such as Representatives John Lindsay,
22
Frank Thompson, and Edith Green, author of the Equal Pay Act. Unions
supportive of making racial discrimination illegal opposed the amendment, as
did Esther Peterson, Director of the Women's Bureau and Assistant Secretary
of Labor.23 Yale law professor Alexander Bickel criticized the amendment in
the New Republic as likely to lead to the bill's defeat."
Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that although the
amendment passed, the newly created Equal Employment Opportunity
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
16. For a fascinating study of the passage of the sex amendment, see generally Carl M.
Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in
Title VIlofthe 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37 (1983).
17.

CAROLINE BIRD & SARA WELLES BRILLER, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF

KEEPING WOMEN DOWN 3 (1968).

18. Id.at4-5.
19. Id.
at5.
20. Id.
21. 88 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith);.see also Brauer, supra note 19, at
45 (arguing fairly convincingly that Smith's motives were "mixed").
22. Brauer, supra note 19, at 50-51.
23. See id.at 51-52.
24. Id.
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Commission (EEOC) decided to treat the prohibition on sex discriminations as
a joke. Herman Edelsberg, its first executive director, publicly stated that the
sex amendment was a "fluke" that was "conceived out of wedlock. 25 He
stated that he and others at the EEOC believed that men were "entitled" to
female secretaries .26
An EEOC member attending a White House conference on equal
opportunity in August 1965 trivialized sex discrimination, saying it was
unclear if the law would require Playboy clubs to hire male bunnies. The New
York Times got into the act, labeling a Commission official the "Deputy
Counsel on Bunnies.' 27 The Times editorialized: "[Bletter if Congress had just
abolished sex itself .... A maid can now become a man. Girl Friday is an
intolerable offense .... The classic beginning of many wondrous careers in the
28
Horatio Alger fashion-Boy Wanted-has reached its last chapter."
Summing up the first few years of EEOC action on sex discrimination,
Representative Martha Griffiths, speaking on the floor of the House, said that
the EEOC had "started out by casting disrespect and ridicule on the law" but
that its "unprofessional"
and "wholly negative attitude" had "changed for the
29
worse."

The result of this attitude was inaction on the part of the federal
government. For the next four years, the Justice Department did not file a
single sex discrimination suit. The reason for this inaction, a Justice
Department lawyer told the President's Task Force on the Status of Women,
was that the Justice Department responds to "social turmoil" and "[t]he fact
that women have not gone into the streets is indicative that they do not take
employment discrimination too seriously." 30 That was soon to change.
Less than a decade later, however, "legal experts on women's rights could
aptly characterize Title VII 'the most comprehensive and important of all
federal and state laws prohibiting employment discrimination.' 3 How did
this happen? It happened because the women's movement exploded in the
years following the passage of the Act, creating pressure for change to which
judges and elected officials responded. The National Organization for Women
(NOW), for example, was founded in 1966, in large part in reaction to this
negative response to Title VII. Other groups were created as well, ranging
from organizations of professional women to consciousness-raising groups of
mostly younger women.
Through mass demonstrations, protests, and
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

89 CONG. REC. 13,689 (1966) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
Id.
BIRD & BRILLER, supra note 20, at 13.
Editorial, De-Sexing the Job Market, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1965, at 20.
89 CONG. REC. 13,689 (1966) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).

30. Jo FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN
EMERGING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 79 (1975).

31. Brauer, supra note 19, at 37.
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lobbying, these groups brought the issue of sex discrimination squarely into
public debate.
Both Congress and the courts responded. In 1972, for the first time and
with large majorities, the Congress passed and sent to the states for ratification
the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution. The Ninety-second
Congress (1971-1973) "passed a bumper crop of women's rights legislationconsiderably more than the sum total of all relevant legislation that had been
previously passed in the history of this country." 32 Included among this
legislation, for example, was Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of
1972, which prohibits educational institutions that receive federal funds from
discriminating on the basis of sex. 33 The courts, too, responded to the political
mobilization, as the Supreme Court began the process of raising the bar over
scrutiny under the
which gender-based classifications had to jump to survive
34
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The necessity as well as the success of this political pressure is illustrated
by the treatment of pregnancy under disability plans. In General Electric
Company v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether a
disability plan that excludes coverage for pregnancy and childbirth violates
Title VII; the Court held that it did not. 35 In response, Congress enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act in October 1978, amending Title VII to make
pregnancy discrimination a type of forbidden sex discrimination. 36 Women
won protection against a form of sex discrimination not because of judges but
rather in spite of them. They won because they were able to exert sufficient
political pressure on Congress to override the Court.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Overcoming discrimination is a good news/bad news story. The bad news
is that discrimination is deeply enmeshed in the fabric of American life; it is
hard to change. But there is good news. The good news is that change is
possible. The enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was a milestone, far
more important than the Brown decision of 1954, in the battle against
discrimination. It was made possible by widespread political mobilization.
Similarly, the implementation of the Act has ebbed and flowed with the
strength of the political pressure its supporters have been able to muster. This
32. FREEMAN, supra note 33, at 202.
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); see also FREEMAN, supra note 33, at 203.
34. The Court started with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which invalidated an Idaho law
that preferred men to women as executors. Although the Court purported to employ a rationalrelations test, the decision could only be explained by some sort of heightened scrutiny. See id. at
76. This was soon followed by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which the Court adopted
intermediate scrutiny as the constitutional test for gender-based classifications. Id. at 197.
35. 429 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1976).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
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is most clearly illustrated by the effectiveness of the women's movement.
When women organized, implementation occurred.
If what I have argued is right, then the future of anti-discrimination law
largely depends on political mobilization. Looking to courts to fight
discrimination without the support of a political movement will work only
sporadically, at best. There will be few supportive decisions, and those that are
supportive are unlikely to be fully implemented. The challenge that advocates
of anti-discrimination face today is that the political movement that pressured
Congress to act in 1964 has never again reached the same level of power.
Without the kind of political mobilization that led to passage of the Act, the
battle to end discrimination is unlikely to make major strides. With that
political mobilization, change is possible.
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